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bankrupt. That's a fact of life. Bank-
ruptcy may occur because of bad
management, an economic downturn,
or simply a change in consumers’
preferences for the products they buy.
As a society, we would like to establish
laws to deal with bankrupt firms that
allow the firms' managers, workers, and
equipment to be deployed elsewhere as
quickly and efficiently as possible if the
firm is no longer viable.  Alternatively,
the best solution may not be to break up
the firm but to have the firm draw up a
new business plan and to reach a new
understanding with its creditors.
In the United States, there are
hat makes more economic sense? A
bankruptcy system that auctions a firm’s
assets and distributes the proceeds among
the creditors? Or one that allows a firm to
seek to resume business after renegotiations between its
stockholders and its creditors? Or is there room — or
even a need — for both? Mitchell Berlin outlines
current U.S. bankruptcy law and looks at recent
research that has reopened the debate on the value of
separate procedures for reorganizing the bankrupt firm.
two different procedures for a firm's
bankruptcy.  One, called Chapter 7 (the
chapter refers to its location in the U.S.
bankruptcy code), auctions all of the
firm's assets and distributes the proceeds
to the firm's creditors.  The second
procedure, called Chapter 11, allows the
firm to go back into business once it has
renegotiated existing contracts with
suppliers and creditors.
For many years, critics — both
legal scholars and economists — have
charged that Chapter 11 is inefficient
and should be eliminated.  They have
argued that reorganization proceedings
under Chapter 11 take too long, that
they reward and entrench incumbent
owners and managers, and that
reorganized firms end up being liqui-
dated anyway, often after multiple
attempts at reorganization.  In contrast,
Chapter 7’s auction procedure is simpler
and more efficient, according to these
same critics.
Nonetheless, the U.S. has yet
to close the book on Chapter 11. And
despite bankruptcy scholars’ criticism of
Chapter 11, other countries have
reformed their own bankruptcy laws to
look more like the U.S. law.  For
example, both England and Germany —
with bankruptcy systems that were
heavily biased toward the liquidation of
enterprises, rather than their rehabilita-
tion — have introduced new provisions
facilitating the reorganization of firms.
Do these reforms fly in the face of
economic reason and experience, or
have the critics of U.S. bankruptcy law
been missing something important?
In fact, recent economic
research has reopened the case against
U.S. bankruptcy law. Researchers have
shown that seemingly objectionable
features of Chapter 11 — for example,
the bias toward incumbent owners —
may make economic sense. Further,
while even proponents of using a single
chapter (such as Chapter 7) have always
recognized practical difficulties — for
example, the possibility that distressed
auctions would fetch fire-sale prices for
the firm's assets — more recent research
has raised new concerns about auctions
as a means to sell firms' assets. Research-
ers have also examined ways in which
auction procedures might be modified to
address some of these concerns.
U.S. BANKRUPTCY LAW
Under both Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11, a bankruptcy filing triggers
an automatic stay.  Under an automatic
stay, the firm's creditors — its bankers,
bondholders, trade creditors, or pension-
ers, among others — must hold off any
attempts to satisfy their claims by
grabbing the firm's assets. In particular, a
secured creditor, whose contract states  Business Review  Q3  2002   19 www.phil.frb.org
that in the event of default, she has the
right to take possession of one (or more)
of the firm’s assets (for example, a drill
press), must wait until the courts decide
who gets what.
The underlying idea of the
automatic stay is to blunt the strong
incentive that the firm's creditors,
especially secured creditors with a legal
claim on particular assets, have to run to
the courthouse to be first in line.  While
the first creditors on the courthouse
steps may get paid in full and would be
satisfied, this disorganized dash would
probably leave creditors, as a group,
worse off. For example, the drill press
may fetch a higher price when sold
along with the factory than if sold
separately, but the creditor with the
secured claim will be concerned only
with whether she can sell the drill press
for more than the unpaid portion of her
loan. A more organized disposal of the
firm's assets could ensure a higher sale
price for all the firm's assets and, thus,
extra dollars to share among the firm's
creditors.
Chapter 7: The Creditor
Comes First.  When a firm enters
Chapter 7, its owners and managers are
immediately replaced by a court-
appointed trustee, who acts as a
representative of all claimants as a
group. The trustee has two essential
roles. The first role is to secure the
highest possible value for the firm's assets
at auction. Assets might be sold
piecemeal; for example, the drill press
might be sold separately from the firm's
factory building (which might have
higher value as a space for an indoor
driving range). Alternatively, the factory
building and all the machines inside
might be most valuable as a single unit.
In this case, the trustee would seek a
bidder for all the firm's assets.
The trustee’s second role is to
distribute the money received for the
firm's assets, that is, to evaluate and rule
on competing claims.1  In those cases
where the firm's financial structure is
simple, this is a straightforward job.2  In
other cases, determining the value of
various claims may be more difficult, for
example, when there are bonds with
different levels of priority and debt
secured by assets.
Even for relatively simple
financial structures, the trustee must be
guided by some general principles in
deciding the value of competing claims.
In the U.S. and most other countries,
the overarching principle is the absolute
priority rule.  According to this rule, all
investors are ranked in order of priority:
Creditors with claims secured by
particular assets — collateral — have
priority over unsecured creditors.
Among the unsecured creditors, those
with seniority clauses in their contracts
will be paid before those without such
clauses. Finally, all creditors have priority
over the firm's stockholders.3  Under the
absolute priority rule, all creditors with
higher priority must be paid the full
value of their claims before those with
lower priority receive a single cent.
Chapter 11: The Last Shall
Be First.  Although a trustee is also
appointed in a Chapter 11 proceeding,
the firm's owners remain in control of
the firm until a reorganization plan has
been accepted.  The trustee has many
roles in Chapter 11, but its main
responsibility is to protect creditors'
interests. In this role, for example, the
trustee will have to approve large
corporate expenditures to ensure that
owners are not seeking to enrich
themselves at creditors' expense.
Unlike the auction and
distribution procedure of Chapter 7,
Chapter 11 takes the form of structured
bargaining among investor groups: the
firm's owners, secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, and so forth.
Bargaining is structured in that Chapter
11 prescribes a set of rules under which
investor groups present reorganization
plans, which are then voted on by
committees representing the investors.4
The firm's owners — often, but not
always, represented by incumbent
management — have the sole right to
propose plans for reorganization for the
first six months. In practice, though, the
court trustee has substantial discretion to
extend this initial period. After six
months — or if the trustee determines
that the owners can't come up with an
acceptable plan — a committee of
creditors may then propose its own
reorganization plan.
A reorganization plan is a
complicated proposal that has two main
elements. The first is a blueprint for
deploying the firm's assets; this blueprint
often calls for the sale of some businesses
and the hiring of a new management
team to run the remaining business.5
The second element is an outline of the
firm's new financial structure, in
particular, how much and what types of
securities the various claimants would
receive.  So, for example, a plan might
propose that the firm's banks — whose
claims are secured — receive stock and
cash worth 92 percent of the value of
their outstanding claims, unsecured
bondholders receive stock valued at 40
percent of the face value of their
outstanding bonds, and the firm's
shareholders retain 7 percent of the
1 I’ve simplified the discussion by talking
about money received for a firm’s assets. In
reality, bankruptcy claimants could receive
securities rather than cash.
2 Financial structure refers to a firm’s mix of
bonds, bank loans, and equity.
3 This is simplified.  Other types of claimants
exist, for example, the IRS and customers
with outstanding lawsuits.  Throughout, I
focus on the main investor groups. David
Epstein's book provides a particularly clear
account of the system of priorities.
4 The trustee determines the precise
structure of the committees.
5 A new management team is put in place 70
percent of the time, according to Edith
Hotchkiss's sample.  Hotchkiss reviews the
evidence concerning management turnover
from other studies.20   Q3  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
reorganized firm's stock.
Note that any reorganization
plan requires an estimate of the firm's
ongoing value, both to permit the trustee
to evaluate whether the plan serves
creditors' interests and to determine
precisely what mix of new securities and
cash each investor group will receive.6
Note also that the payments in
the example, which are in line with
actual U.S. experience, do not respect
absolute priority, even though the
bankruptcy code explicitly calls upon
trustees to follow this rule. Most
strikingly, the firm's existing owners
systematically retain a share of the
reorganized firm, even though unse-
cured creditors have received much less
than the outstanding value of their
claims. Many commentators note that
this systematic bias away from absolute
priority is the predictable effect of the
rules of Chapter 11. Specifically,
incumbent owners have lots of power,
both because they retain control of the
firm and because they get to offer the
initial reorganization plan. This power
enables them to retain a share of the
reorganized firm, even though investors




Let's Get Rid of Chapter 11.
In articles that have been influential
among legal scholars and economists,
lawyer Douglas Baird and economist
Michael Jensen have argued that
Chapter 7 can be used either to liqui-
date or to reorganize firms, and, thus,
there is no need for a separate bank-
ruptcy procedure for reorganizations.
One of the key functions of a
bankruptcy mechanism is to create an
orderly forum for answering two related
questions: (1) Are the firm's assets worth
more if the firm is simply broken up? (2)
Should the firm be placed under new
management? But why not settle these
questions by auction, with current
owners and management teams bidding
along with others for the firm's assets? If
these assets are more valuable together,
the winning bidder will propose reorgan-
ization, rather than liquidation. And if
current management is the most
capable, the winning bidder would not
necessarily replace them with new
managers.
A large economic literature
supports the use of well-designed
auctions as a mechanism for getting the
largest possible value for the firm's assets
and, in turn, yielding the highest payoff
for a firm’s creditors.7
In contrast, according to its
many critics, the structured bargaining
of Chapter 11 leads to systematically
poor outcomes in economic terms. In
addition to promoting the systematic
violation of absolute priority,8   Chap-
ter11 serves as a venue for entrenching
inefficient managers (who were, after
all, running the firm when it went
bankrupt), and the lengthy bargaining
process itself leads to increased costs, for
example, lawyers’ and accountants’ fees
and other court costs.9
Of course, the case for Chapter
7 and against Chapter 11 is not really as
clear cut as the preceding arguments
would make it seem, as I'll discuss later.
But underlying most economic argu-
ments against Chapter 11 (and in favor
of a single creditor's chapter like
Chapter 7) is a simple but powerful
economic idea about the features of a
well-functioning bankruptcy mecha-
nism. The mechanism should keep
separate two issues: (1) how to get the
most money for the firm's assets; and (2)
how that money should be distributed.
The reason for keeping these
issues separate is that while all the firm’s
creditors may agree on little else, they
— indeed anyone with a potential claim
on the firm — would agree that all will
be made better off if there is a larger pie
to divide. And a substantial body of
economic knowledge supports using
auctions as a means of getting the
largest pie. However, bargaining among
investor groups over competing reorgani-
zation plans invariably mixes the issues
of getting the most for the firm's assets
and distributing the claims on those
assets. It is unlikely that such bargaining
would ever arrive at a plan that gives
creditors the most money to split up.10
And since bargaining takes time, the
6 Stuart Gilson, Edith Hotchkiss, and Richard
Ruback's article presents compelling evidence
that reorganization plans have systematic
biases in their estimates of firms’ value. For
example, the firm’s priority bondholders would
prefer that the court place a low dollar value
on the firm, so that subordinated bondholders
and stockholders would receive only a small
share of the claims on the reorganized firm.
7 Paul Klemperer's article contains a good
review of the existing theoretical literature on
auctions.
8 The merits of absolute priority are discussed
below.
9 The evidence for systematic violations of
absolute priority in Chapter 11 is voluminous.
See the articles by Edith Hotchkiss for
evidence about how often inefficient
managers remain entrenched. See the article
by Julia Franks, Kjell Nyborg, and Walter
Torous for a range of estimates of the
administrative costs of Chapter 11.
10 Mixing the two types of issues also makes
bargaining more complicated and creates
stronger incentives for groups to use
bankruptcy proceedings in a strategic way.
According to its many critics, the structured
bargaining of Chapter 11 leads to
systematically poor outcomes in economic
terms.  Business Review  Q3  2002   21 www.phil.frb.org
firm’s assets may be declining in value
while investor groups dicker.11
The Reasons for Respecting
Absolute Priority.  Chapter 11's
systematic violation of absolute priority
in favor of incumbent stockholders is
essentially a distributional issue. If so,
what is the significance of the particular
distribution dictated by the absolute
priority rule? Essentially, absolute priority
ensures that claimants’ payoffs are made
in the same order of priority that would
have existed had the distressed firm
never entered bankruptcy at all. As
argued by Thomas Jackson in his
influential book, a well-designed
bankruptcy mechanism avoids a race to
the courthouse to prevent a disorderly
— and value-destroying — assertion of
creditors’ rights, but it should not
overturn contractual agreements that
were freely negotiated by the firm and
its investors. These contracts were
negotiated with an eye toward keeping
the firm's funding costs as low as possible
and with the intention of raising the
firm’s value as much as possible.
Deviations from absolute
priority will increase the firm's borrowing
costs, since creditors who expect to lose
out in bankruptcy demand compensa-
tion through a higher rate of interest.12
Even worse, deviations that are hard to
predict with certainty raise the firm’s
financing costs higher still because





Baird’s and Jensen's criticisms of
Chapter 11 has taken issue with the
view that an efficient bankruptcy
mechanism would necessarily look like
Chapter 7: an auction that gets the
largest possible price for the firm's assets,
followed by a distribution of the money
received in line with the absolute
priority rule.13
Auctions May Not Obtain
the Highest Price for a Firm's Assets.
A key feature that distinguishes an
auction in bankruptcy from many other
auctions is that the potential bidders
include individuals with existing claims
on the object to be auctioned.  In
addition to the firm's current owners,
the firm’s creditors or other investors
might also choose to make competing
bids. For example, vulture investors
— those who buy up a distressed
firm's debt at discounted prices in
order to play a significant role in
bankruptcy proceedings — are
experts at managing and breaking up
bankrupt firms.14
In a textbook auction, no
bidder would ever choose to bid more
for an asset than it was worth because
the bidder has no prior claim on the
auctioned item. However, this is not true
if the bidder has a prior claim on the
asset. Existing claimants systematically
overbid, that is, they bid more than they
think the assets are worth. An existing
claimant overbids because if he loses, he
gets a share of the money paid by the
winning bidder. Thus, unlike in a
textbook auction, the claimant gains if a
competing bidder ultimately pays too
much for the asset.15  But this means
that any potential bidder must take into
account not only the possibility of high
bids from someone who places a higher
value on the firm's assets but also the
possibility of high bids from someone
whose valuation is actually lower than
her own. This is a problem because some
outside bidders — ones not connected
with the firm — who may have superior
11 Legally, the trustee may petition the court
to shift the bankruptcy proceedings from
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 if he or she feels that
creditor interests would be served.  However,
the trustee could not unilaterally choose to
make this decision.  Instead, the court would
decide after a hearing, with all groups of
claimants represented.
12 This argument is not immune to criticism.
Some economists have argued that freely
negotiated contracts won’t lead to the lowest
possible financing costs, so long as the firm
negotiates contracts in sequence with
different investors.  For example, the firm may
offer collateral to a new creditor, thus
reducing the value of all existing unsecured
claims. Fearing this, prior investors would
demand a higher interest rate or contractual
protections that the prior investors — or their
lawyers — must monitor closely. This line of
thinking has raised questions about the
desirability of absolute priority.  See, for
example, Lucien Bebchuck and Jesse Fried’s
article discussing these and related issues.
13 In this article, I focus on recent
theoretical work on the use of auctions in
bankruptcy.  I don't emphasize some
important issues, for example, whether the
difficulty of obtaining funding might act
as a barrier for some bidders or the
possibility that a distressed firm will be
forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices.
Both of these problems further reduce the
relative attractiveness of auctions
compared with structured bargaining.
Oliver Hart's article discusses and
evaluates some of these issues.
14 Edith Hotchkiss and Robert
Mooradian's article describes the
activities of vulture investors.
15 Mike Burkart's article explains overbidding
in the context of a model of competing bids to
take over a firm, although he notes that the
same ideas apply to bankruptcy proceedings.22   Q3  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
plans for running the firm (or selling its
assets) will be driven away from the
auction.16
Separating Asset Deploy-
ment Issues and Distribution Issues
May Be Impossible. One reason
auctions of a firm's assets have appeared
attractive to economists who think
about bankruptcy is that a large
literature on auctions has established
that many types of auction procedures
will yield the same expected revenues to
the seller.17  We might conclude that
while existing claimants will disagree
about how revenues should be distrib-
uted, they should all agree upon an
auction procedure that generates the
highest expected price.
But the article by Sugato
Bhattacharyya and Rajdeep Singh
shows that senior and junior creditors
would disagree about the choice of
auction procedures, even when the
auctions yield the same expected
revenues. The reason is that while we
can predict the expected revenues for an
auction, the actual price that will be paid
by the winning bidder is uncertain. The
riskiness of the bids will be important to
the firm's creditors, and different types
of creditors will have different risk
preferences. Specifically, junior creditors
will prefer auction procedures with a
higher probability of both very low and
very high bids because they get paid
only if the senior creditors have already
been paid in full.18  And auction
procedures that generate a wide
dispersion of returns increase the
probability that junior creditors will get
paid. By the same reasoning, senior
creditors prefer auctions with a narrower
range of bidding.19
One conclusion we can draw
from Bhattacharyya and Singh's article
is that there is no bankruptcy procedure
— and that includes auctions — in
which asset deployment and distribu-
tional issues can be completely sepa-
rated, at least as long as investors hold
different types of claims that yield
different preferences about risk. (See
The Options Approach, for an ingenious
auction procedure that helps overcome
this problem.)
TWO CHAPTERS ARE BETTER
THAN ONE
Much of the literature on
bankruptcy has assumed that absolute
priority is a necessary component of an
efficient bankruptcy law.  However, a
recent article by Elazar Berkovitch and
Ronen Israel explains why systematic
deviations from absolute priority may
make economic sense.20   Their model
indicates that an efficient bankruptcy
system includes a number of features
that resemble the different bankruptcy
laws we observe around the world. In
fact, their model demonstrates that
some types of economies are best served
by a bankruptcy mechanism with two
chapters: a creditor's chapter with
similarities to Chapter 7 and a debtor's
chapter with similarities to Chapter 11.
Thus, their model suggests that a
bankruptcy mechanism like that in the
U.S. does have certain desirable
features. However, Berkovitch and
Israel’s research also suggests that other
types of economies are best served by a
single chapter: the creditor's chapter.
This system resembles the traditional
British bankruptcy system.
The two types of chapters
differ according to who initiates the
bankruptcy and whether the chapter
violates absolute priority by giving
incumbent stockholders a share of the
reorganized firm. The debtor's chapter is
initiated by the firm's stockholders and
violates absolute priority. The value of
violating absolute priority is that
stockholders are given an incentive to
voluntarily seek bankruptcy if they have
information that the firm is likely to fail.
Stockholders will never
voluntarily seek the protection of the
bankruptcy court unless there is
something to gain by doing so. Inducing
stockholders to voluntarily enter
bankruptcy can be valuable because the
firm's owners are often the first to
become aware of serious financial
troubles. Postponing bankruptcy too long
hurts all creditors because a troubled
firm's assets typically continue to decline
in value until the firm is reorganized or
dissolved. Thus, even creditors would
agree to give up a piece of a larger pie to
shareholders if it’s necessary to induce
stockholders to enter bankruptcy
voluntarily.
The creditor's chapter, which,
as its name suggests, is initiated by
creditors, respects the absolute priority
rule. This chapter permits creditors that
are well informed about the firm's affairs
19 The precise result shown by Bhattacharyya
and Singh is that a senior creditor strictly
prefers a sealed-bid first-price auction to a
sealed-bid ascending-bid auction, while a
junior creditor prefers the opposite.  In an
ascending-bid auction, bids rise until all but
one bidder has dropped out. Thus, the winner
need only pay (slightly more than) the price
bid by the second-highest bidder. When the
ascending-bid auction is a sealed-bid auction,
none of the bidders sees when the others drop
out.  In a sealed-bid first-price auction the
winner pays his or her own bid price, rather
than the price bid by the second-highest
bidder. Since the bids are sealed, bidders do
not see one another’s bids..
20 This is the most ambitious of a series of
articles by Berkovitch and Israel (along with
Jamie Zender) that explain why violations of
absolute priority may be desirable. The
common theme of these articles is that
managers, with superior information, must be
provided incentives to act on investors’
behalf.  In general, this requires that the
manager receive a share of the firm's value in
bankruptcy.
16 Per Stromberg's article presents some
empirical evidence that overbidding actually
occurs in Swedish bankruptcy auctions.
17 Some of the more familiar forms of auctions
include the ascending-bid auction and the
sealed-bid auction.
18 Actually, junior creditors (like all
creditors) would prefer auctions that yield
only high bids most of all. To focus on
different investors’ preferences for different
degrees of risk, Bhattacharyya and Singh
compared auction procedures that have the
same expected return and different amounts
of dispersion  Business Review  Q3  2002   23 www.phil.frb.org
to petition for bankruptcy without giving
anything to incumbent owners. Unless
the creditors are relying on the firm’s
owners to enter bankruptcy voluntarily,
creditors would never give the owners a
portion of the money received for the
bankrupt firm’s assets. Owners will
typically work harder to make the firm
profitable and avoid bankruptcy if they
know they’re not getting a share of the
assets when the firm goes bankrupt.
Either System May Be
Superior. In an undeveloped financial
market, especially one characterized by
strong relationships between a borrower
and its lender, Berkovitch and Israel
predict that an efficient bankruptcy law
will have only a creditor's chapter.21
In a relationship-driven
financial market, adding a debtor's
chapter would be both not very helpful
and too costly. Not very helpful, because
the lender's information about the
borrower is likely to be good when
relationships are close; thus, the
creditor's chapter will enforce efficient
liquidation most of the time even
without using the firm's information.22
Too costly, because a firm with bad news
about its prospects will have a powerful
incentive to use the debtor's chapter to
preempt its lender from initiating
proceedings, so as to capture a share of
the payoffs in bankruptcy.
In an economy without close
lending relationships, but with many
different individuals, analysts, and
investors producing information about
firms, a two-chapter system may be both
feasible and desirable. In such a system,
a firm can't predict with certainty what
creditors know about its financial
condition, since the information
available to a firm's owners and the
information available to market partici-
pants are different. In this case, should a
firm's owners become aware of serious
problems, they will not always seek court
protection to pre-empt creditors from
forcing the firm into bankruptcy.  After
all, it may turn out that the firm’s
creditors won’t receive information that
would lead them to do so. Nonetheless,
the firm's owners will sometimes enter
bankruptcy voluntarily, thus improving
the decisions made about liquidating
and reorganizing firms. In such an
economy — for example, the United
States — two chapters can coexist and
improve on a single-creditor chapter.
Interestingly, Berkovitch and
Israel's model predicts that in an econ-
omy in which firms reduce their reliance
on banks and shift more of their financ-
ing toward capital markets, an efficient
bankruptcy system would shift from a
single-chapter system (with only the
creditor's chapter) to a two-chapter
system. This shift toward capital markets
is a trend in many developed countries.
And, as predicted, many nations have
introduced bankruptcy reform (and
reform proposals) along the lines of the
two-chapter model in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Recent economic scholarship
on the efficiency of existing bankruptcy
mechanisms has been a productive
source of insights. Substantial empirical
evidence holds that Chapter 11
reorganization proceedings are drawn
out, costly affairs, with a significant bias
toward incumbent owners that is
reflected in systematic deviations from
absolute priority. Some critics have
suggested replacing the two-chapter
bankruptcy system of the U.S., in which
auctions are used to liquidate firms in
Chapter 7 and bargaining among
claimants is used to reorganize firms in
Chapter 11. Specifically, the critics
argue that all bankruptcies, whether
liquidations or reorganizations, can be
handled through auctions.
These proposals have gener-
ated further debate. While the outcome
of the debate is not conclusive, a
number of provisional conclusions have
arisen. Although critics have com-
plained that Chapter 11 proceedings
don't separate the valuation of the firm's
assets from the distribution of this value
to claimants, it now seems clear that
auctions suffer from the same problem.
Furthermore, theorists have provided
explanations not only for systematic
deviations from absolute priority but also
for bankruptcy mechanisms with
significant similarities to the two-chapter
bankruptcy mechanism in the United
States.
21 The combination of undeveloped financial
markets and strong relationships is probably a
fair description of Japan until the 1980s.
22  If creditors have conflicting interests — for
example, if some claims are collateralized — it
is possible that creditor-initiated proceedings
could lead to premature liquidation. However,
the automatic stay greatly reduces the possi-
bility that any creditor could gain by pushing
the firm into bankruptcy prematurely.
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s long as existing claimants on the bankrupt
firm have different types of claims,
decisions about how the firm’s assets should
be handled can’t be separated from
decisions about how the value of these
assets should be distributed. Thus, claimants would not
unanimously support efficient plans for selling the firm’s
assets or reorganizing under new management.
Lucien Bebchuck proposed the following approach to
satisfying claimants in bankruptcy.a The basic idea is that if
all creditors have the same type of claim, their interests are
harmonized, and getting the most value for the firm’s assets
becomes everyone’s objective. Bebchuck’s idea is to give
senior creditors all of the firm’s equity. They would receive
pro rata shares, according to the size of their claim on the
firm. Junior creditors would receive options to buy senior
creditors’ shares for cash. The firm’s stockholders would
similarly receive options to buy out the claims of both classes
of creditors.b
To get an idea how this would work, consider a highly
simplified example with only two types of claimants. At
bankruptcy, the firm has 100 bondholders, each with $1
debt outstanding, and five shareholders, each with 20 shares
of the firm’s total 100 shares of stock issued. Under this
scheme, the 100 shares of stock would be distributed
equally among the 100 bondholders, with each receiving
one share. Each stockholder would receive an option to buy
up to 20 shares of stock at $1 per share. The exercise price of
the option ($1) is set so that the firm’s former bondholders
are obliged to sell their current shares as long as they are
offered at least as much as the face value of the their
original bond.c
Before individuals make decisions about whether to
exercise their options, a trustee would solicit plans for selling
the firm’s assets or reorganizing the firm. Participants’ ability
to buy and sell their options would ensure that those
individuals who place the highest value on the firm could
amass a majority of the firm’s equity. Under this procedure,
there is no need for everyone to agree that a particular plan
for the firm is best; those who don’t agree would sell their
option to the individual who places the highest value on the
firm.
If the firm’s former stockholders believe that the firm
is worth less than $100 — even under the best plan — they
would not exercise their options to buy the firm’s shares
because the cost of exercising the option exceeds the value
of the firm. However, if they believe that under some plan
the firm is worth, say, $120, the firm’s former stockholders
would choose to exercise their options to buy the firm’s
shares for $100. And since options can be sold, if other
investors believe that they have a plan worth more than
$100, the former shareholders would gladly sell their options
even if they disagree about the value of the plan.
Of course, no procedure is perfect.  This approach
does not overcome the problem that existing claimants have
an incentive to overbid. Thus, we can’t assume that bidders
with the highest valued plan for the firm’s reorganization or
liquidation will participate.  Also, as in any auction, the
procedure will work well only if those who place a high
value on the firm can also finance their purchase of equity
or options. Furthermore, for firms with both secured debt
and unsecured senior debt, the procedure may not be as
straightforward as in the example. In this case, the proce-
dure must take account not only of the value of the plan as




aAlthough the basic idea is Bebchuck’s, Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore extended Bebchuck’s procedure to include a separate
stage in which potential suitors propose different reorganization plans, as developed here.
b The scheme does not require that investors purchase all of the claims of a senior class.  However, an investor (or group of investors) may need
to purchase a majority of the shares of the firm to gain control of the firm to ensure that a particular reorganization plan is carried out.
c For a firm with a more complicated financial structure — with claims of many different priorities — a junior group receives options to buy out
all claimants who are senior to that group.  The version of Bebchuck’s scheme developed here maintains absolute priority by requiring the
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